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The income gap between rich and 
developing countries is still the most 
influential factor driving transnational 
migration. Although strict border controls 
and selection criteria have erected 
barriers, thousands of people who do not 
meet the requirements have reached their 
destinations, while even greater numbers 
would like to do so. As individual effort 
cannot ensure successful cross-border 





My research focuses on Tingjiang, a rural region along the south-
east coast of China known for decades 
as a source area of transnational migra-
tion. I have tried to trace how the cur-
rent migration trend towards high 
income states began, developed and 
expanded. Undoubtedly, the migration 
wave has been the result of a combina-
tion of many interacting factors. Here 
I focus on migration brokerage, a key 
node in migration networks. 
Emergence of brokerage 
Tingjiang is at the mouth of the Min 
River. For as long as anyone can remem-
ber, young local men have been sailors. 
With the coming of modern shipping, 
many youths were employed by foreign 
shipping companies, and when their 
ships called at New York some sailors 
jumped ship to try their luck ashore. 
This was how people from Tingjiang 
began their lives in the United States in 
the first half of the 20th century. 
Emigration was interrupted after the 
establishment of the People’s Repub-
lic of China and condemned as coun-
ter-revolutionary during the Cultural 
Revolution. In the mid-1970s, when 
the Cultural Revolution was near its 
end, returned overseas Chinese and 
their families received permission to 
travel abroad if they could provide the 
required documents. Permission was 
severely restricted but emigration had 
become possible again; Tingjiang resi-
dents with relatives in the U.S. seized 
the opportunity. New regulations in the 
reform era allowed returned migrants, 
especially those who had family mem-
bers abroad, to migrate once again. 
As most applicants were unfamiliar with 
the necessary formalities, most applica-
tions were arranged by Chinese abroad. 
Some successful applicants were able to 
obtain permanent residency upon arriv-
al based on family ties or were granted 
work permits and settled down; others 
went to Hong Kong where opportuni-
ties were plentiful and wages much 
higher than in the PRC. News from the 
first emigrants was so encouraging that 
more followed. Only a small percentage 
of potential migrants, however, met the 
selection criteria. Many others needed 
help.
Helping people go abroad was first 
motivated by affection, friendship or 
sympathy, but as demand for help grew, 
it became a business. Relatives of over-
seas Chinese could more easily obtain 
passports and entrance visas, so some 
became brokers themselves, arranging 
transnational marriages and adoptions. 
Though this trend began with real mar-
riages and adoptions, false arrange-
ments soon appeared. As few could 
master the complicated procedures, it 
became a business for experts.
Sister Ping: illegal migrant to 
illegal broker
In June 2005, a series of reports in Chi-
nese language media in the U.S. attract-
ed the attention of Chinese immigrants 
and their relatives in mainland China. 
The reports concerned a woman on 
trial in New York, Sister Ping, accused 
of having amassed US$40 million by 
smuggling Chinese into the U.S. and of 
involvement in the tragic death of doz-
ens of stowaways.1
Sister Ping (full name Zheng Cui 
Ping)2 was born in a peasant family in 
Tingjiang and received only a primary 
school education. In 1974 she and her 
husband emigrated to Hong Kong; in 
1981 she settled in New York’s Chi-
natown as an undocumented worker. 
Nobody knows how she managed to get 
her green card within a year of her arriv-
al. Ping started to help her relatives and 
friends emigrate. At first, in exchange 
for her assistance, she received rewards 
of appreciation, but soon it became an 
open secret that ‘it takes money to buy 
every step of emigration’. In Tingjiang 
in the mid-1980s, the quoted price for 
helping a person emigrate to the U.S. 
was US$18,000. By the end of the 
1990s, the price had skyrocketed to 
US$60,000-70,000.
When Ping was just starting out, a new 
law boosted her business. The imple-
mentation of the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act enabled 2.7 million 
undocumented immigrants to obtain 
permanent residency status. Among 
the lucky ones were hundreds of Sis-
ter Ping’s first customers. When this 
news spread in Ping’s home region, she 
became a local heroine. 
In the late 1980s Ping began renting 
and buying freighters to smuggle larg-
er groups. According to online news 
reports, groups organised by Ping often 
included hundreds of people, and her 
largest group, according to what I heard 
during my fieldwork in Tingjiang, might 
have included 500 people. In June 1993 
the world was shocked when 300 Chi-
nese on board the decrepit freighter 
Golden Venture made an emergency 
landing during which 11 passengers 
drowned. Although Ping did not own 
the freighter, she had lent money to the 
owner and had helped in the overall 
planning. After the tragedy, Ping was 
one of the most wanted smugglers in 
the United States. But she used a fake 
passport and did not cease running her 
business until she was arrested at Hong 
Kong airport in April 2000. 
From snakehead to tail: the 
emigrant broker hierarchy
Unauthorised emigration brokers, 
dubbed ‘snakeheads’ by the Chinese 
state media, comprise a three-tiered 
hierarchy linking source and destina-
tion countries. At the top are the ‘big 
snakeheads’: small groups (like Sister 
Ping’s) who legally live abroad and use 
large sums of money to ‘pave the way 
out’ of China and into the destination 
country. They organise and expand tran-
snational migration networks, take care 
of documents or facilities for clients, 
and/or bribe officials in China and else-
where.  
The middle tier is comprised of insti-
tutional brokers who often work for 
officially registered companies in the 
migration source area. Authorised to 
procure labour for export and assist par-
ticipants in study abroad programmes 
and internationally contracted projects, 
these companies often provide train-
ing in languages, cooking, nursing, 
basic computer skills, job interviewing, 
document preparation and sometimes 
how to apply for legal status after arriv-
ing illegally. Clients pay for the training 
and upon completion receive a certifi-
cate which can be used to prove that the 
holders meet the immigration require-
ments of the destination state. 
The bottom tier of brokers are local 
agents who act individually. They have 
connections with the middle tier but 
may also have contact with a ‘big snake-
head’ through, as in Sister Ping’s exam-
ple, that snakehead’s fellow villagers. 
Their task is to find potential custom-
ers and introduce them to companies or 
snakeheads. For each recruited migrant, 
the company or snakehead pays the 
local agent a commission ranging from 
a few thousand to tens of thousands of 
renminbi. 
Hopeful migrants consider payment 
of the broker’s fee an investment. The 
actual amount depends first on antici-
pated income in the destination coun-
try; the brokerage fee for expediting 
migration to the U.S. is always higher 
than for Europe. Second, it depends 
on the complexity of the services. 
Most difficult, and thus most expen-
sive, is acquiring official immigra-
tion status, but if the applicant agrees 
to go abroad as a contract worker to 
countries such as Israel or Kuwait, the 
charge will be lower. Third, it depends 
on the applicant’s status. If the appli-
cant is more or less qualified to meet 
immigration requirements, the fee 
will be lower. If the applicant needs 
to be ‘trained’ to qualify, the price will 
increase accordingly.
Since the late 1990s, the Chinese 
authorities have declared human smug-
gling illegal and local police have been 
hunting down smugglers. After the 
Dover tragedy in England, where 58 
Chinese stowaways were found dead 
in a truck, dozens of snakeheads were 
arrested and put in prison. Many of 
those arrested, however, were at the bot-
tom of the hierarchy; their direct contact 
with the victims meant they could be 
identified. Big snakeheads such as Sis-
ter Ping, however, often live abroad and 
possess several passports. Their crimi-
nal activities cannot be stopped without 
transnational co-operation. 
The view from Tingjiang
On 16 March 2006, Ping was sentenced 
to 35 years in prison, meaning this 57-
year old woman would spend the rest 
of her life in jail. Many Chinese immi-
grants in New York disagreed with the 
judgement. The commonly held opin-
ion was that Ping ‘is a good migration 
broker because she helped a lot of her 
co-villagers realise their dreams of 
upward mobility.’ And, ‘Only in the eyes 
of the American officials was what she 
did criminal.’ The head of the Fujianese 
association in New York said, ‘Sister 
Ping enjoys the best reputation among 
dozens of snakeheads. She did offend 
the immigration law of America. But 
from a moral perspective she is not a 
criminal. She is innocent.’3
None of the people I interviewed in 
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Ping’s hometown regarded her as a 
criminal, though some maintained 
silence on the issue. One man told me 
Ping gave him a special discount for 
channelling his son to the U.S. because 
they were former classmates. ‘She is 
always kind in responding to requests 
of help’, he said. ‘My son could not get 
into the U.S. without her help. I could 
not build this five-story house without 
my son’s money.’ When asked whether 
it was criminal that Ping had charged 
so much, one interviewee in Ping’s 
hometown told me, ‘It is reasonable 
because she needed money to buy the 
way for us. The money can be earned 
back so long as the person can get 
into the US…. All companies charge 
money for labour export. Only those 
who received money but did not send 
the payers to the destination state are 
criminal.’ According to my research, 
this is the consensus among Tingjiang 
natives.  
The people of Tingjiang evaluate tran-
snational migration brokerage from 
three perspectives: first, whether the 
broker delivered the clients to the desti-
nation efficiently; second, whether the 
journey was safe; and third, whether the 
broker charged a reasonable fee. Accord-
ing to a local saying, it is more difficult 
to find the right broker than to borrow 
enough money to pay the brokerage fee. 
Taking these grass-roots principles into 
account, it is understandable that Sister 
Ping received the highest praise from 
her fellow villagers. According to Peter 
Kwong at Hunter College, focusing her 
business on smuggling Chinese makes 
Sister Ping a very capable business 
woman. He added, however, that praise 
from her compatriots cannot erase her 
criminal activities. 
The attractiveness of working abroad 
– regardless of its legality – is the 
reward of high income for hard work. 
However, for the average person who 
is not qualified to meet the entrance 
criteria of destination states, upgrad-
ing one’s economic status through 
emigration cannot occur without a 
broker’s ‘help’. If brokers are able to 
make emigration possible, they are 
socially accepted, and if their busi-
ness is successful, they will even be 
admired. Brokers are indispensable 
for making transnational migration 
possible for average people. 
Illegal but licit
The transnational migration industry 
in China has become institutional-
ised. To participants, the contradiction 
between official migration policies 
and practical labour needs in destina-
tion states transforms formally illegal 
transnational migration into accept-
able (licit) practice. The whole proc-
ess of brokerage exists in between 
legal and illegal realms, both in China 
and the destination states; while none 
of these states openly support illegal 
practices, their policies – wittingly or 
not – have contributed to illegal activ-
ity. From a broker’s perspective, it is 
often difficult to see the line between 
a smuggler (snakehead) and a legal 
agency dealing with the affairs of 
going abroad. Sometimes, legal agen-
cies channel their clients illegally 
while undocumented brokers channel 
their clients legally. 
Destination states have strengthened 
controls on immigration, but while gov-
ernments desire talented people such 
as entrepreneurs and professionals, 
the market demands cheap labourers. 
Illegal migrants often hold the low-pay-
ing ‘3D’ (difficult, dirty and dangerous) 
jobs that natives of high income states 
reject. Moreover, some high income 
states occasionally legalise employed 
illegal immigrants to uphold their legal 
rights, a possibility that tends to make 
such immigrants believe that their ille-
gal status is only temporary. 
Among Tingjiang residents, there is no 
doubt that the government has made 
great efforts to stop human smuggling. 
Severe penalties have been imposed, 
especially on snakeheads. Posters and 
pamphlets publicise the government’s 
decision to crack down on human 
smuggling and urge villagers not to 
partake in it. However, successful Chi-
nese returning from abroad, especially 
if they invest in or donate to their home 
region, are met with great honour. 
In the eyes of the migrants and their 
family members, ‘being channelled to 
another country’ is not a criminal act, 
but a worthwhile undertaking chosen 
by people who wish to make a fortune 
abroad but lack the legal entitlement. As 
long as migration is successful and the 
costs are acceptable, no one cares how 
the brokers deliver – what matters is the 
end result. <
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1.  The relevant reports can be found in various Chinese news websites. 
 For instance: http://www.fujianese.cn/news; http://www.chinapressusa.com/index.htm.
2.  In some English news reports the name has been translated as Chen Chui Ping.
3.  Quoted from the relevant news report in Qiao Bao (China Press in USA), available online:  
http://www.chinapressusa.com/index.htm.
Beware of the data
The conclusion that smuggling is carried out by powerful criminal organisations is often based 
on government reports and official statements, whereas the conclusion that smuggling is 
carried out through looser social networks is often based on field interviews. Is one right and 
the other wrong?
Melvin Soudi jn
Newspaper articles and government reports warn of 
‘snakeheads’ who organize the journey from China 
to the West. These journeys can take weeks or even 
months, are sometimes dangerous and cost as 
much as €30,000. It takes migrants years to repay 
this debt, often by working in exploitative conditions. 
These statements together paint a disturbing picture: 
the smuggling of Chinese people is an evil business 
where migrants fall prey to powerful criminal organi-
sations. 
On the other hand, interviews with smugglers often 
show that they are not engaged in other types of 
crime. Transport is often provided through family 
networks and social contacts. Migrants themselves 
prove not to be hapless victims, but conscious users 
of services provided by smugglers. Following the 
famous military theorist Clausewitz, human smug-
gling seems nothing more than the continuation of 
migration by other means. 
Contradictory findings about Chinese human smug-
gling can often be explained by looking at the kind 
of data used and the method of their collection. In 
general, there are two ways in which empirical data 
on Chinese human smuggling is collected: through 
government sources (eg, court files) and field inter-
views with (illegal) migrants and smugglers. The two 
methods have their particular advantages and disad-
vantages.
Analyses of court files provide insights into the organ-
isational aspects of human smuggling. Statements 
by perpetrators, police observations, searches of 
persons or premises and conversations recorded on 
tapped telephone lines provide information on how 
smugglers work together. Nevertheless, researchers 
need to take a number of limitations into account. 
First, there is the question of how representative the 
subjects really are; the smarter smugglers may oper-
ate quite differently from those who get caught. Sec-
ond, police observations can be incomplete, thereby 
painting a skewed picture; criminal bosses take pre-
cautionary measures, so relationship charts tend to 
be inaccurate. Third, data are collected for specific 
purposes, namely for investigation and criminal pros-
ecution, not for scientific research. A lot of data rel-
evant to social science research is therefore absent, 
such as suspects’ backgrounds and motives. 
Information on human smuggling can also be 
obtained through fieldwork, which entails interview-
ing smuggled persons or, better yet, the smugglers 
themselves. Zhang and Chin’s 2002 study, for exam-
ple, drew on interviews with 87 smugglers in America 
and China. The advantages of fieldwork are obvious: 
researchers obtain first-hand information. If inter-
viewers can work without interpreters, they benefit 
from direct contact with respondents; with a sensi-
tive subject like human smuggling, this can remove 
at least one potential barrier. But there are disadvan-
tages, too. As with court files, it is never clear how 
representative willing interviewees really are, and 
smuggled persons usually have a limited view of 
smuggler’s efforts to get them across borders. 
Information obtained through court files and field 
interviews is rarely compared. Studies based on field-
work generally do not use the conclusions of govern-
ment reports, except to disown them. Sometimes 
government reports acknowledge the role of indi-
viduals or small networks in smuggling illegal aliens 
into the country. These reports, however, focus on 
more serious forms of smuggling, so-called organised 
smuggling, operations that are encountered (and duly 
combated) in large-scale police investigations. Field 
research presumably misses these organisations as 
they are deemed unapproachable, which makes one 
wonder whether materials obtained through police 
investigations do indeed throw a whole new light on 
the subject. Fortunately, I had the opportunity to ana-
lyse just the kind of data likely to contain information 
on the more organised type of smuggler: Dutch court 
files. 
Court files show many similar findings as those of 
field interviews: the involvement of women, the lack 
of central co-ordination, the importance of a good 
smuggling reputation and the lack of criminal diver-
sity. But court files also provide new insights. In 
the Dutch case, most noticeable is the presence of 
non-ethnic Chinese and the cohesion of smuggling 
groups. Field studies often miss the presence of non-
ethnic Chinese because, in general, they focus on the 
Chinese community, ie, ethnic Chinese smugglers. 
The Dutch police investigation, however, was able 
to observe non-ethnic Chinese and smuggling group 
cohesion because police closely followed the actions 
of several important organisers of Chinese smuggling 
for eight months or more. Even in the highly unlikely 
event that a field researcher would come across this 
type of smuggler, getting him to talk would likely 
prove extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
However, the researcher should also be aware that 
court files generally do not address simple forms of 
illicit migration. This is to be expected, as smuggling 
via purely migratory-based, as opposed to organised 
crime-based ties is situated more on the unorgan-
ised end of the smuggling spectrum. Because certain 
‘invisible thresholds’ of police practice come into play, 
the former are not easily investigated and brought 
to court. For example, interviews with government 
officials show that police investigations are more 
likely to be carried out if more than one smuggler 
is involved in more than one recent incident, while 
no sanctions were applied to those who fraudulently 
became guarantors of visa applicants. Officials stated 
in interviews that the cost of prosecuting such cases 
outweighs the benefits, as chances of conviction are 
slim and the punishments negligible. The result is 
that small-time smugglers (or so-called ‘mom and 
pop’ smuggling operations) are essentially absent 
from the court files. 
This makes it perfectly understandable why official 
government reports stress Chinese smuggling as a 
highly organised criminal activity and overlook other, 
simpler methods of illicit migration, whereupon field 
interviews stress the involvement of family networks 
and social contacts and overlook other, highly organ-
ised criminal activity. Still, court files leave questions 
unanswered. Why do people go to certain countries? 
What is the role of family or kinship connections? 
Only fieldwork can fill these gaps. Therefore, it is not 
the case that the conclusion based on one source is 
right and the conclusion based on the other is wrong. 
Each comes to certain conclusions that the other by 
design cannot come to, let alone pursue. Neither do 
they necessarily contradict each other. In fact, court 
files and field interviews can be used in a complemen-
tary fashion to gain a more complete understanding 
of Chinese human smuggling. <
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